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MIRANDA, PLEASE REPORT TO THE
PRINCIPAL’S OFFICE
Meg Penrose ∗
[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone. 1

The age of an alleged criminal offender undoubtedly affects his or her
ability to appreciate the consequences of confessing to criminal behavior.
Courts have long accepted that youth and inexperience impact an
individual’s ability to make a voluntary confession. 2 Accordingly, this
Article addresses whether Miranda v. Arizona—the seminal Fifth
Amendment decision providing procedural rights to those enduring
custodial interrogation 3—should apply to students interrogated by school
officials during school hours.4 To answer this difficult question, this
Article first provides a brief overview of the law of minors and confessions.
Next, it considers the increasing law enforcement presence on our school
campuses and evaluates how this presence affects the role of school
officials. Finally, the high level of cooperation between law enforcement
and school officials in criminal law enforcement are considered to
determine whether Miranda should apply in the principal’s office.5
A.

MIRANDA’S APPLICABILITY TO JUVENILES

The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
∗ J.D., Pepperdine School of Law; Managing Editor, Pepperdine Law Review; LL.M., Notre
Dame Law School. My experiences as a consultant to the United States Department of
Justice (USDOJ) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children on school safety issues served as the impetus for
this article. I would like to thank my research assistant John Rogers, my colleague Bernie
James, and my dear friend Vivian Houng for their guidance and advice on the piece. As the
author, however, any errors are attributable to me alone.
1. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
2. See id. at 14.
3. 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966).
4. Id.
5. While due process considerations remain important in any confession or
interrogation analysis, this article will maintain a narrow focus on the application of
Miranda to questioning by school officials in schools.
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inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure
the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any
significant way. 6

On at least five occasions, the United States Supreme Court has
considered cases involving minors and confessions. 7 The Court’s
jurisprudence can be easily categorized into two main areas: cases
involving Due Process or voluntariness challenges to confessions, and
cases addressing purported Miranda violations in obtaining confessions. In
both contexts, however, the Court has clearly indicated that there exists a
distinction between minors and their adult counterparts in evaluating
whether the confession should be utilized in criminal proceedings. As the
Court emphasized in Gault, “admissions and confessions of juveniles
require special caution.” 8

6. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
7. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663 (2004) (holding in a five-four plurality
decision that the Miranda custody inquiry relies on an objective test); Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U.S. 707, 728 (1979) (assessing, under the “totality of the circumstances” test, whether
sixteen-year-old juvenile waived his Miranda rights); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967)
(concluding that “the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the
case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults”); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55
(1962) (prohibiting use, under “totality of the circumstances” test, of confession obtained
from fourteen-year-old boy who was held by police for five days without access to his
mother or other adult advisor); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) (precluding, on
Due Process grounds, admission of confession garnered through holding fifteen-year-old
boy incommunicado for more than three days, during which time his lawyer twice tried to
gain access to him).
The Court’s most recent pronouncement in Alvarado evaluated the Miranda custody
question through the very limited prism of federal habeas corpus review. Alvarado, 541
U.S. at 655. Because the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act severely delimits
federal review of state habeas claims, the Court did not consider the custody question
squarely and without constraint. Id. at 665. Rather, much of the opinion focuses on the
narrow question of whether the lower courts unreasonably applied federal law. Id. at 66669. The important component of Alvarado, however, remains Justice O’Connor’s oneparagraph concurring opinion. Id. at 669. Although four Justices found that while the youth
of an individual may be relevant to the Due Process voluntariness issue, they were unwilling
to hold that age, standing alone, affects the Miranda custody issue. Id. at 666-68. Justice
O’Connor’s brief concurrence left open the possibility that “[t]here may be cases in which a
suspect’s age will be relevant to the Miranda ‘custody’ inquiry.” Id. at 669 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice O’Connor’s hesitation regarding the consideration of age and its effect
on custody inquiries prevented Alvarado from becoming binding authority on lower courts.
Id. As her opinion reveals, Justice O’Connor’s reticence to incorporate age as a variable in
the Miranda custody issue in this particular case was due to the fact that Alvarado was
nearly eighteen years old at the time of the interview. Id.
8. Gault, 387 U.S. at 45.
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Lowers courts, also, have distinguished between youthful offenders and
their more senior peers. 9 These same courts, however, have increasingly
been willing to broach the germane issue of who should be evaluated when
assessing the voluntariness and admissibility of a minor’s confession.10
Under Miranda and its progeny, the consideration has been strictly limited
 —usually police officers. But, with the
to law enforcement officers
increased police presence in both public and private schools, courts must
now address the relationship between school resource officers (SROs)
(those police officers that are regularly scheduled to work at schools in
both a school disciplinary and law enforcement capacity) and the teachers
and principals who work in conjunction with SROs to maintain safety,
order, and discipline on campuses.
Lower courts have addressed this sensitive and synergistic relationship
in the New Jersey v. T.L.O. search and seizure context,11 but have not been
as forthcoming in the confession arena where students need greater
protection. 12 Just two years ago, Justice Breyer resurrected the concept of
in loco parentis as it relates to the intersection of school discipline and
school law enforcement. 13 Generally, the transition in modern times has
been to move away from the more liberal approach taken in Tinker v. Des
Moines 14 and toward an increasingly restrictive notion of students’ rights in
the overlapping criminal law and school discipline context. 15 Students may
retain their Fourth Amendment rights, though somewhat diluted, but their
Fifth Amendment rights more readily fall victim to the dual capacity of
school official as part teacher, part state actor.16 While courts recognize

9. In re Andre M., 88 P.3d 552, 555–56 (Ariz. 2004) (en banc) (reversing the lower
court’s opinion that a sixteen-and-a-half-year-old’s confession was voluntary because his
mother was barred from the interrogation that occurred on school premises).
10. In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. 2002) (finding juvenile should have received
Miranda warnings prior to questioning by SRO at school); In re G.S.P., 610 N.W.2d 651,
658 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (finding twelve-year-old “in custody” where principal informed
student he must answer questions proffered by police officer).
11. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
12. Miranda specifically noted that modern confession protections are geared toward
psychological manipulation rather than physically oriented violations. Miranda, 384 U.S. at
448. Observing the shortcomings of confession tactics, the Court observed, “[i]nterrogation
still takes place in privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our
knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms.” Id.
13. Bd. of Educ. of I.S.D. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 840 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
14. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
15. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (finding that
random urine testing on students participating in extracurricular athletics does not offend the
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures).
16. Commonwealth v. Ira I., 791 N.E.2d 894, 900–901 (Mass. 2003) (stating that school
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that school teachers and principals are cloaked with power as state actors in
the Fourth Amendment scenario, their power as state actors in the Fifth
Amendment context is murky, at best. Coupled with this fickle state actor
role status is the dilemma that SROs continue to work in conjunction with
school officials to question students for law enforcement purposes—not
simply for school discipline purposes. 17
At this juncture our modern precedent proves increasingly deficient.
School officials who question children in a custodial fashion, having pulled
the child out of classes where they must otherwise be present, should not be
able to shed their state actor status in order to extract a confession that will
be used by law enforcement officers for criminal prosecution.18 While
school officials should remain entitled to question students for school
disciplinary purposes, these disciplinary purposes frequently become
subterfuges, if not pretext, for the quick referral of minors to the local
police department and criminal prosecution.19
Courts should take greater care in distinguishing the role of educators
and SROs who engage in questioning of juveniles at schools. While school
“custody” may differ from police station custody, courts must begin
addressing whether school principal and SRO questioning is the functional
equivalent of “custodial interrogation.” 20 Let us now assess the nature of
the relationship between school officials and their minor charges. If in loco
parentis permits stricter discipline and more invasive searches, then courts
should apply this same stringency to the questioning of minors and delimit
the collaboration allowed between school officials and law enforcement
when the confession of a minor is at issue. Either school officials are state
actors for Constitutional purposes or they are not. If courts permit school
officials and law enforcement to have it both ways, whereby principals may
officials acting within their capacity as educators and not as instruments of the police are not
required to provide Miranda warnings) (citing Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363,
1369 (Mass. 1992)).
17. In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331, 332-33 (Pa. 2002); In re R.J.E., 630 N.W.2d 457, 459
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 642 N.W.2d 708 (Minn. 2002); In re G.S.P.,
610 N.W.2d 651, 653-54 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
18. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 (summarizing the Court’s holding as follows: “when an
individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in
any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination
is jeopardized”) (emphasis added). While Miranda’s “in custody” assessment generally
uses more restrictive language focusing squarely on police officers, this more broad
language provides ample guidance for other authorities that also assist law enforcement with
custodial interrogation.
19. See, e.g., In re Angel S., 758 N.Y.S.2d 606, 607 (App. Div. 2003) (student
questioned by principal in presence of fire marshals).
20. See In re D.J.B., No. C3-02-731, 2003 WL 175546, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 17,
2003) (unpublished opinion).
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search as state actors yet question criminal suspects without being
considered state actors, then the final vestiges of Tinker’s promise that
students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate has
vanished. 21
B.

THE STATUS OF THE LAW: APPLICATION OF THE TOTALITY OF
THE CIRCUMSTANCES

Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is
available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect
persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any
significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. 22

In many, if not most cases, courts have been reluctant to view school
officials—even those individuals employed at schools as SROs—as state
actors falling within the ambit of Miranda. Rather than considering the
inherently coercive and custodial nature of the school setting, courts
frequently focus only on whether a reasonable student would feel he or she
was free to exit the interview. 23 It is naïve to assume that an individual
pulled involuntarily out of class would feel capable of exercising the right
simply to return from where he or she was removed. This dogmatic
application, while consistent with the literal Miranda “custody”
requirement, 24 turns a blind eye to the reality that most students do not
recognize, much less exert, an ability to rebuff the school official’s
inquisitorial advances. Thus, courts continue to take a constrained view of
Miranda’s applicability in schools by assessing, under the totality of the
circumstances, whether a particular juvenile believed he or she was “in
custody” while being questioned by school officials.
A relevant, oft-cited opinion, is In re Killitz. 25 Decided in 1982, this
opinion considered whether a junior high student’s incriminating

21. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. (“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”)
(emphasis added). Courts and commentators, however, continually omit the specific First
Amendment references from the renowned quote and simply reference Tinker as a shorthand
citation for the protection of students’ Constitutional rights at school. See, e.g., Earls, 536
U.S. at 829; Acton, 515 U.S. at 655-56; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985).
22. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
23. Cf. In re Drolshagen, 310 S.E.2d 927, 927 (S.C. 1984) (finding there was no custody
because the student voluntarily reported to the principal’s office, even though the
appearance was at the request of the investigating police officer).
24. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (“Miranda warnings are required
only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him in
custody.”).
25. 651 P.2d 1382 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
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statements made to a police officer during a school interview violated
Miranda. 26 At issue was whether the juvenile defendant had committed an
off-campus burglary. 27 The principal summoned the student during school
hours to the principal’s office where an armed, uniformed police officer
interviewed the student in the presence of the school principal.28 Neither
the school principal nor the officer informed the juvenile defendant that he
was free to leave or disregard their questions. 29 Indeed, in finding that the
juvenile was subjected to a custodial interrogation invoking the Miranda
protections, the court emphasized that the defendant “was in school during
regular hours, where his movements were controlled to a great extent by
school personnel.” 30 Further, that “defendant cannot be said to have come
voluntarily to the place of questioning” because he would likely have been
subjected to disciplinary actions had he refused the principal’s command to
come to his office. 31 Based upon all these factors, the court found that the
juvenile had been subjected to a custodial interrogation, precluding the
admission of his incriminating statements in subsequent criminal
proceedings. 32
Another significant opinion is In re G.S.P., from the Minnesota Court of
Appeals. 33 G.S.P., a twelve-year-old, was accused of bringing a gun to
school when his backpack was left behind in the locker room after a
football game. 34 The following morning, G.S.P. was removed from class
by the assistant principal and the uniformed school liaison officer, Officer
Johnson. 35 When G.S.P. asked why he was being taken out of class, the
assistant principal said he would explain when they were in his office.36
Once in the office, the assistant principal informed G.S.P. that he “had no
choice but to answer the questions,” and Officer Johnson informed G.S.P.

26. Id. at 1383 (setting forth the issue in the case as “invol[ving] the admissibility of
incriminating statements made by a junior high school student while being questioned in the
principal’s office by a police officer”).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1383-84 (observing that “[n]either the police officer nor the principal said or
did anything to dispel the clear impression communicated to the defendant that he was not
free to leave”).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1384.
32. Id. In reaching its decision, the court also considered that the juvenile had been
questioned as a suspect not merely as a witness. Id. at 1383. However, this consideration
has not been uniform in school decisions and was not likely decisive.
33. 610 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
34. Id. at 653.
35. Id. at 653-54.
36. Id. at 654.
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that a tape recorder would be on. 37 The principal began by stating he was
going to ask a few questions and then “turn it over to Officer Johnson.” 38
In finding the interview tantamount to a custodial interrogation the court
emphasized that “where, as here, a uniformed officer summons a juvenile
from the classroom to the office and actively participates in the
questioning, the circumstances suggest the coercive influence associated
with a formal arrest.” 39 Further, the court noted “[t]he record reveals that
G.S.P. was questioned for potential criminal conduct, not just for
misbehavior at school. The questions were reasonably likely to elicit a
criminally incriminating response.” 40 Thus, while noting that there is
nothing wrong with police officers participating in the investigation of
school disciplinary issues, where the focus of questioning is to elicit
criminally incriminating information from a suspect, the protections of the
Fifth Amendment must be fully afforded. 41
The crucial fact in G.S.P. was that the court found the school official to
be working in concert with the police officer. The court believed that the
interchange between the assistant principal, G.S.P., and Officer Johnson
constituted a single episode rather than two distinct interviews. 42 Like the
Oregon decision in Killitz, the Minnesota G.S.P. court held that “a Miranda
warning must be given by all that use the power of the state to elicit
criminally incriminating responses.” 43
Two state supreme courts have dealt directly with this issue. 44 In 2002,
in In re R.H., the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered whether
SROs should be considered “law enforcement officers” within the purview
of Miranda, where the SRO conducted a twenty-five minute school
interview of a juvenile vandalism suspect. 45 The defendant was removed
from class during school hours by the SRO. 46 During the interview, the
SRO asked defendant to remove his shoe to compare it to footprints left in
the vandalized classroom, and then informed the juvenile defendant that he
was keeping the shoe for evidence.47 Not until the juvenile admitted his

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
2004).
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 658.
Id.
Id. at 659.
Id.
Id.
In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331, 333-34 (Pa. 2002); In re Andre M., 88 P.3d 552 (Ariz.
In re R.H., 791 A.2d at 334.
Id. at 332.
Id.
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involvement were his mother and the municipal police department
contacted. 48
Finding that the juvenile student was entitled to receive Miranda
warnings under the circumstances presented, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reversed the juvenile’s adjudication of delinquency. 49 In a fractured
opinion with two dissenting and two concurring opinions, the majority of
the court agreed that because the interrogating school police officers were
wearing uniforms and badges, and because “the interrogation ultimately led
to charges by the municipal police, not punishment by school officials
pursuant to school rules,” the SROs were deemed to be law enforcement
officers subject to the strictures of Miranda. 50
The most persuasive opinion in In re R.H., however, was authored by
Justice Newman, who wrote that courts should extend T.L.O. “to the Fifth
Amendment context and hold that the school officials should give the
student Miranda warnings when the constitutional interests of the student
outweigh the interest of the school in solving the crime.” 51 In addition,
Justice Newman announced a laudable test for determining whether
juvenile interviews are custodial when occurring on school campuses:
When weighing the constitutional interests of the student in this setting,
courts should consider the following factors: (1) the age of the student to
be questioned (the older the student is, the more likely the information
elicited from him in an interrogation will be used against him in a court of
law, rendering Miranda warnings more necessary); (2) the ability of the
juvenile to understand the Miranda warnings, if they are given; (3) the
gravity of the offense alleged (likewise, the more serious the offense the
school officials are investigating, the more likely that he will be
criminally charged); (4) the prospect of criminal proceedings, as opposed
to merely school-related discipline; and (5) the extent of the coercive
environment in which the questioning occurs. 52

As Justice Newman noted, “recognizing that the school setting is sui
generis, the school officials can demonstrate that the warnings are not
necessary if, after balancing the factors articulated above, it was reasonable
for them not to Mirandize the student.” 53 Justice Newman’s balancing test
provides school officials with the necessary and time-honored latitude in
dealing with disciplinary issues that are truly school-related. Where,

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 333–34.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 348 (Newman, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.

PENROSE_CHRISTENSEN

2006]

2/3/2011 10:19 PM

MIRANDA

109

however, the focus of the inquiry is more criminally-related, the Newman
variables provide school officials with notice that Miranda is applicable
and, accordingly, should be respected. Without painting a bright line,
Justice Newman tactfully strikes the balance between the needs and
protections afforded school officials under T.L.O., and the increasingly
active law enforcement role that school officials are voluntarily assuming
in modern society. Under this view, it appears the traditional Miranda
“totality of the circumstances” test may be inappropriate for use in school
cases.
The only other state supreme court to consider the issue of schoolhouse
confessions is Arizona, in In re Andre M., an en banc opinion.54 Although
this case did not involve Miranda directly, the court did consider the
repercussions of excluding a parent from a school interview where the
parent has asked to be present during the questioning. 55 A sixteen-and-ahalf-year-old juvenile was sent to his high school principal’s office to be
questioned about his suspected involvement in a fist fight. 56 The school
initially contacted the juvenile’s mother, who awaited further questioning
of her son by the police. 57 Thereafter, the juvenile’s mother left the room,
having been assured that her son would not be questioned by the police
unless she was present or a school principal was designated to sit in for
her. 58 Despite these assurances, the juvenile was questioned by three
police officers and the mother was prevented entry into the interview by
another police officer, who was sitting outside the interview room. 59
Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the Arizona Supreme
Court found that the juvenile In re Andre M. had not voluntarily confessed
to the police, yet refused to adopt the juvenile’s invitation “to hold that if
the police deliberately exclude a parent from his or her child’s
interrogation, without good cause to do so, any resulting statement must be
suppressed.” 60 The court did, however, place great emphasis on the fact
that the juvenile’s mother was intentionally excluded from the schoolhouse
questioning. 61 While this decision may have little relevance to the more

54. In re Andre M., 88 P.3d 552, 555 (Ariz. 2004) (en banc).
55. Id. at 553 (wherein the court “granted review to consider the standard for
determining the voluntariness of a juvenile’s confession when a parent has been denied
access to her child’s interrogation”).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 553-54.
59. Id. at 554.
60. Id. at 555.
61. Id. at 556. While the court recognized “that circumstances may justify, or even
require, the exclusion of a parent” in certain cases, this case was not deemed to be one of
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discrete Miranda analysis, the case is important because it found that the
failures to “Mirandize” a student and to include a parent in an on-campus
police interview resulted in the suppression of an involuntary confession.
As previously discussed, confessions can be excluded from evidence either
under Miranda or Due Process voluntariness grounds. In re Andre M.
provides important guidance, because courts will continually grapple with
the issue of student confessions.
Beyond the obvious factors of police/school entanglement, courts
scrutinize school interviews and assess custody by considering: (1) the age
of juvenile; (2) whether the law enforcement figure is in uniform, armed,
and participating in the interview; and (3) whether the juvenile was
informed that he or she had the right to leave the interview because they
were not under arrest. 62 Curiously, however, courts do not seem concerned
about the broad latitude given to school officials to question students on
non-school offenses such as burglaries, sexual assaults or other off-campus
behaviors. Courts should vigilantly assess whether school officials are
working in concert with law enforcement and thereby abandoning their in
loco parentis role. Likewise, courts should evaluate whether the school
official is tending to or inquiring about matters related to the safety, order,
and discipline of campus, not merely the business of students and their offcampus lives. Abandoning the narrow focus of custody and opting for a
more scrutinizing assessment of why a particular juvenile is being
interviewed on campus by school officials should preclude school officials
and SROs from immunizing their pseudo-law enforcement activities under
the guise of T.L.O. and its progeny. 63
Where the behavior is school related and deals strictly with disciplinary
issues, the Fifth Amendment poses no obstacle to school officials
furthering the safety and order of their charges. Unfortunately, the current
state of affairs often involves school officials with non-school-related
offenses and asks them to “assist” in interviewing potential criminal
them. As the court explained:
When, however, the state fails to establish good cause for barring a parent from a
juvenile’s interrogation, a strong inference arises that the state excluded the parent
in order to maintain a coercive atmosphere or to discourage the juvenile from fully
understanding and exercising his constitutional rights.
Id. at 555-556 (citations omitted).
62. In re Welfare of R.J.E., 630 N.W.2d 457, 460-61 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
63. But see Jefferson v. State, 449 So. 2d 1280 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984). No problem is
presented where a student voluntarily presents him or herself at the principal’s office for
purposes of confession to criminal behavior. Id. at 1281 (finding student voluntarily
reported to the principal’s office thereby negating any need for Miranda warnings). The
focus of this article is the compulsory activity of school officials in requiring a student to
report to the principal’s office for purposes of an interview.
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suspects. Where the purpose of the interview, even remotely, is to elicit
evidence intended for use in criminal proceedings, the dynamic of the
exchange transforms immediately into a setting where the Fifth
Amendment and its full protections should be afforded and honored. It is
this latter scenario where a silver platter doctrine equivalent should be
applied to prevent school officials from unjustly stripping juveniles of their
constitutionally guaranteed rights.64 Schools should limit themselves and
their investigations to school-related disciplinary issues. Nothing in T.L.O.,
Acton, or Earls hinted that they enjoy any greater powers.
C.

INCORPORATING THE SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE INTO AN
INCREASINGLY POLICE-LIKE SETTING

To maintain a “fair state-individual balance,” to require the government
“to shoulder the entire load,” to respect the inviolability of the human
personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the
government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against
him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple
expedient of compelling it from his own mouth. 65

The majority of cases assessing Miranda’s viability on school campuses
bypass the important question of whether school officials are working in
concert with police officers to effectuate criminal prosecutions of juveniles.
The assumption is that school officials are not working, either tacitly or
patently, as agents of the police. However, unlike the scenarios presented
in T.L.O. and Acton, many modern cases illustrate that school officials do
work in tandem with police to ensure that juveniles not only receive school
penalties for misbehavior, but also face criminal prosecution for violating
state criminal codes. 66 While juveniles should not escape criminal
prosecution for criminal behavior, the mandates of criminal procedure
should fully extend to juveniles who are interrogated by the same
individuals likely to participate in their subsequent criminal prosecution.
For better or worse, school officials are increasingly becoming active
participants in the criminal process.
Supreme Court precedent supports “the conclusion that questioning by
any government employee comes within Miranda whenever ‘prosecution
of the defendant being questioned is among the purposes, definite or
contingent, for which the information is elicited.’”67 In this holding,

64.
65.
66.
67.

See generally Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
See discussion supra, Part B.
See State v. Heritage, 61 P.3d 1190, 1194 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
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Washington’s Court of Appeals quoted Professor Wayne LaFave, who
wrote that the “definite or contingent” purpose for which information is
elicited “will often be manifested by the fact that the questioner’s duties
include the investigation or reporting of crimes.” 68
In recent years, schools have been legislatively required or have
voluntarily consented to participate in programs requiring the reporting of
any behavior that, while possibly violating a school rule, qualifies as a
criminal offense. 69 Schools now routinely collaborate with police officers
when a student is found to have drugs, drug paraphernalia, or weapons and
offenses which clearly violate both school regulations and criminal law.70
Schools also assist the police in investigating allegations relating to assaults
(fighting) 71 and sexual assaults (incest or rape),72 the majority of which
occur off-campus. It is in these latter instances, particularly, that school
involvement cannot encompass anything other than pseudo-police
behavior. Non-school events that have predominantly, if not exclusively,
non-school effects should disqualify school officials from working in
concert with police officers without invoking traditional criminal procedure
protections.
Frequently, local school districts employ police officers with dual
assignments as both teacher and law enforcement officer.73 Courts should
not readily dismiss the police qualities these individuals possess and
express while working on school campuses. Rather, courts should accept
that these individuals possess the full arsenal of police powers: search,
68. Id. (citing 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET. AL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.10 (c), at 624 (2d
ed. 1999)).
69. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14 § 4112(b)(1) (2001).
70. Id.
71. Commonwealth v. Ira I., 791 N.E.2d 894, 897 (Mass. 2003) (assault and battery of
fellow juvenile student off-campus).
72. There are many excellent examples of cases where sexual assaults occurred offcampus but were investigated by school officials and police officers in an on-campus
interview. See In re J.A.S., No. A04-521, 2005 WL 44455 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2005)
(unpublished opinion); In re D.J.B., No. C3-02-731, 2003 WL 175546 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan.
17, 2003) (unpublished opinion) (court held statements regarding off campus sexual assault
must be suppressed because juvenile deemed to be in custody where SRO interviewed
juvenile in a conference room at juvenile’s school); State v. R.B., No. 41618-9-I, 1998 WL
729678 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1998) (unpublished opinion) (court found no custodial
interrogation where seventeen-year-old was interviewed for six or seven minutes by a police
detective at school despite fact that alleged rape took place off-campus); State v. Doe, 948
P.2d 166, 168 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997) (SRO requested ten-year-old juvenile be removed from
class where he was interviewed by the SRO about an alleged sexual assault that had
occurred off campus, and the court held that his statements during this interview must be
suppressed under Miranda.).
73. See
National
Association
School
Resource
Officers,
http://www.nasro.org/about_nasro.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
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seizure, arrest, and, most notably, interrogation. It is time that our
jurisprudence reflect the growing reality that school officials, not just
school resource officers, are taking on a greater and more active role in
their communities’ efforts to eradicate juvenile crime.
While the era of T.L.O. proved vital in making schools safe for learning
purposes by empowering school officials with the ability to perform
searches under the less stringent reasonable suspicion standard, the modern
decisions of Acton 74 and Earls 75 reflect a concern that juvenile crime can
best be quelled with the proactive assistance of school officials.76 Yet,
both Acton and Earls are remarkable in that each decision ratified the
suspicionless urine searches at issue because the results were not turned
over to law enforcement.77 Instead, students testing positive for drug use in
each instance were required to submit to non-criminal sanctions—a fact
that should not go unnoticed. 78 As school officials and SROs take more
initiative in eradicating crime on campuses, courts should recognize the
limited reach of T.L.O., Acton, and Earls. 79
School safety can remain a paramount concern without resulting in
simultaneous criminal prosecutions. If school safety is the true concern,
something that is debatable at this point, then police involvement is not
relevant because the sanctions should be limited to those required to keep
students and school officials safe. But as school officials and SROs
continue to take a more active role in working with police officers to
provide police with information gleaned from schoolhouse interviews,
courts should evaluate whether the “prosecution of the [student] being
questioned is among the purposes, definite or contingent, for which the
information is elicited.” 80
D.

THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL QUESTIONING

Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on
information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with the
authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut
74. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-66 (1995).
75. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S
822 (2002).
76. See generally Meg Penrose, Shedding Rights, Shredding Rights: A Critical
Examination of Students’ Privacy Rights and the “Special Needs” Doctrine After Earls, 3
NEV. L.J. 411 (2002-03).
77. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833; Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.
78. Id.
79. See Penrose, supra note 69, at 433.
80. Washington v. Heritage, 61 P.3d 1190, 1194 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis
added) (citing United States v. D.F., 63 F.3d 671, 683 (7th Cir. 1995)).
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fact. 81

Chief Justice Warren summarized the decision in Miranda as holding
that, “when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to
questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized.”82 It is
time to assess precisely what Justice Warren intended when he used the
more amorphous language “by the authorities” in summarizing this
landmark decision. The case was not likely intended to apply solely to law
enforcement officers in the most narrow, traditional sense. We know this
to be true through application of precedent extending Miranda’s
protections to non-police scenarios such as Mathis v. United States83 and
Estelle v. Smith. 84 State courts have also mandated Miranda warnings
when park security officers questioned juveniles regarding drug use 85 and
where police interviewed a juvenile at a children’s shelter. 86 Thus,
extension of Miranda outside the narrow arena of police station
questioning is neither revolutionary nor inconsistent with past decisions.
Courts must begin considering the heritage of this great opinion and
evaluate whether present day school officials are more akin to law
enforcement officers maintaining a custodial power over students’
movements or sufficiently distinguishable because school officials lack the
actual power of arrest. Courts likewise should assess whether school
officials are working in tandem with police officers to transcend the
traditional safety, order, and discipline environment of schoolhouses into
the more accusatorial environment of police stations. If, as it appears, the

81. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468–69.
82. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 (emphasis added).
83. 391 U.S. 1, 5 (1968) (finding Internal Revenue Service (IRS) civil investigator who
questioned defendant while the defendant was in jail custody on another matter was required
to provide defendant Miranda warnings for matters relating to the IRS investigation).
84. 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding Miranda applicable to psychiatric examination
performed on defendant).
85. See Heritage, 61 P.3d at 1194-95 (relying heavily upon Mathis and Estelle to find
that, because arrest of the juveniles was “at least a contingent purpose of the questioning,
and one of the duties of the security guards was the investigation of criminal activities in the
park,” the guards were analogous to traditional police officers, mandating the application of
Miranda). In Heritage, the park security guards were found to be acting within their official
capacity as city employees and were “wearing bullet-proof vests under T-shirts bearing gold
badges with the words ‘Security Officer’ on them. Although they did not carry firearms,
each officer also wore a duty belt containing pepper spray, a collapsible baton, handcuffs, a
radio, and a flashlight holder.” Id. at 1195.
86. In re L.M., 993 S.W.2d 276, 289-91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“Appellant was
isolated and alone during the police interrogation. This was despite the fact that the shelter,
through the Department [of Protective and Regulatory Services], had the duty to care for
and protect appellant.”).
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tide is turning and schoolhouses are becoming mere extensions of station
houses, the time is upon us to realistically view school officials in their
modern capacity as “the authorities,” as fleetingly described in Miranda,
and provide students the full panoply of Fifth Amendment rights protecting
against self-incrimination. While school officials should not be limited
where questioning centers solely on matters of school discipline, that world
has seemingly passed us by. Now, in order to combat the pressures
inherent in the school setting “and to permit a full opportunity to exercise
the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and
effectively appraised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be
fully honored.” 87

87. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 443.

